Title: Two-Stage Mechanism Design for Electric Vehicle Charging with Day-Ahead Reservations Show Chinese title

Title: 基于日前预约的电动汽车充电两阶段机制设计

Abstract: We propose a general two-period model where electrical vehicles (EVs) can reserve charging sessions in the day-ahead market and swap them in the real-time market. Under the model, we explore several candidate mechanisms for running the two markets, compared using several normative properties such as incentive compatibility, efficiency, reservation awareness, and budget balance. Specifically, reservation awareness is the only property coupling the two markets and dictates that an EV will not get a lower utility by joining the real-time market. Focusing on the real-time market, we show that two variants of the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism do not satisfy all the proposed properties; specifically, one is not reservation-aware, while the other is not budget-balanced. Moreover, we show that no mechanism satisfies some combinations of the properties. Then, we propose to use a posted-price mechanism to resolve the issue, which turns out to be the dynamic pricing mechanism adopted in many real-world systems. The proposed mechanism has no efficiency guarantee but satisfies all the other properties. To improve efficiency, we propose to use a VCG auction in the day-ahead market that guides the reserve prices in the real-time market. When EVs' valuations in the two markets are highly correlated, the proposed approach results in highly efficient outcomes. Show Chinese abstract

Abstract: 我们提出一个一般的两阶段模型，其中电动汽车（EV）可以在日前市场预订充电时段，并在实时市场进行交换。 在该模型下，我们探讨了几种运行两个市场的候选机制，并使用若干规范性质进行比较，如激励相容性、效率、预订意识和预算平衡。 具体来说，预订意识是唯一将两个市场耦合的性质，它规定电动汽车加入实时市场不会获得更低的效用。 专注于实时市场，我们表明经典Vickrey-Clarke-Groves（VCG）机制的两种变体不满足所有提出的性质；具体来说，一种不具有预订意识，另一种不具有预算平衡。 此外，我们表明没有机制能满足某些性质的组合。 然后，我们建议使用定价机制来解决这个问题，这实际上是许多现实系统中采用的动态定价机制。 所提出的机制没有效率保证，但满足所有其他性质。 为了提高效率，我们建议在日前市场使用VCG拍卖，以引导实时市场的预留价格。 当电动汽车在两个市场的估值高度相关时，所提出的方法会产生高效率的结果。