标题： 后量子密码学认证在量子密钥分发中的应用 显示英文标题

标题： On Post-Quantum Cryptography Authentication for Quantum Key Distribution

摘要： 传统的量子密钥分发（QKD）用户加入量子网络的方式是通过使用预共享密钥材料进行身份验证。 虽然这种方法对于小规模网络来说已经足够，但由于所需的预共享密钥数量呈总体二次增长，随着网络规模的扩大，这种方法变得不切实际。 为了解决可扩展性问题，公钥基础设施（PKI）结合后量子密码学（PQC）提供了一个更可扩展的解决方案，使用户能够远程对QKD流量进行身份验证，在所提出的假设下获取信息论安全（ITS）密钥。 与依赖经典密码算法（如RSA）的传统PKI不同，本文提出的方法利用了被认为能够抵抗量子攻击的PQC算法。 类似于SIGMA或TLS协议，可以对抗有界对手实现身份验证、机密性和完整性，以确保安全且可扩展的量子网络。 显示英文摘要

摘要： The traditional way for a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) user to join a quantum network is by authenticating themselves using pre-shared key material. While this approach is sufficient for small-scale networks, it becomes impractical as the network grows, due to the total quadratic increase in the number of pre-shared keys required. To address this scalability issue, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) combined with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) offers a more scalable solution, allowing users to authenticate the QKD traffic remotely to obtain information-theoretical secure (ITS) keys under the presented assumptions. Unlike traditional PKI, which relies on classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, the approach presented in this paper leverages PQC algorithms that are believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. Similarly to the SIGMA or TLS protocols, authentication, confidentiality, and integrity are achievable against bounded adversaries to ensure secure and scalable quantum networks.