标题： 认知层次理论和二人博弈 显示英文标题

标题： Cognitive hierarchy theory and two-person games

摘要： 许多社会和经济互动的结果，如股票市场交易，强烈取决于参与者对其他个体行为的预测。认知层次理论提供了一个框架来建模预测准确性的影响，该框架已被证明适合某些类型博弈论实验的数据，例如凯恩斯主义美丽竞赛和进入博弈。在这里，我们关注对称的两人两策略博弈，并建立了一个算法，根据认知层次方法找到玩家的策略。我们表明，雪堆博弈表现出一种行为模式，其复杂性随着玩家认知层次的增加而增加。除了找到前三层认知水平的解决方案外，我们在这一理论框架中展示了雪堆博弈的两个新特性：i）任何雪堆博弈仅能通过一个参数——其类别来表征，ii）它们在收益空间的对角线方面是反对称的。最后，我们提出了一种基于进化动力学的模型，该模型捕捉了认知层次理论的主要特征。 显示英文摘要

摘要： The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive Hierarchy Theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian Beauty Contests and Entry Games. Here, we focus on symmetric two-players-two-actions games and establish an algorithm to find the players' strategies according to the Cognitive Hierarchy Approach. We show that the Snowdrift Game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: i) any snowdrift game can be characterized by only a parameter -- its class, ii) they are anti-symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the pay-off's space. Finally, we propose a model based on an evolutionary dynamics that captures the main features of the Cognitive Hierarchy Theory.