标题： 使同伴的主观幸福感可见会损害以合作者为中心的实验社交网络 显示英文标题

标题： Making the Peers' Subjective Well-being Visible Impairs Cooperator-centered Experimental Social Networks

摘要： 过去的实验表明，声誉或了解同伴过去的合作行为可以增强人类社会网络中的合作。 另一方面，了解同伴的财富会削弱合作性，而了解同伴的相互联系和网络结构则不会影响合作性。 然而，尚不清楚在社会网络中使同伴的主观幸福感（SWB）可见是否能增强或削弱合作性。 因此，我们进行了在线网络实验（N = 662，分布在50个联网群体中，进行15轮互动），其中研究参与者通过公共物品游戏与连接的同伴合作或背叛，与其他同伴建立和切断社会联系，并对其SWB进行评分。 我们在保持连接同伴的声誉和游戏内财富可见的同时，操纵了连接同伴的SWB可见性（25个可见SWB组 vs. 25个不可见SWB组）。 结果表明，使同伴的SWB可见并未改变整体合作性、财富、相互联系或SWB。 相反，可见SWB的联网群体比不可见SWB的联网群体表现出更多的社区数量和更低的传递性（即一个同伴的同伴也是同伴的情况比例）。 这些现象被可见SWB网络中决策模式的变化所解释：合作者不太可能与合作者建立联系，而更可能与背叛者建立联系，因此合作者无法维持其受欢迎程度或留在网络中心。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Past experiments show that reputation or the knowledge of peers' past cooperation can enhance cooperation in human social networks. On the other hand, the knowledge of peers' wealth undermines cooperativeness, and that of peers' interconnectedness and network structure does not affect it. However, it is unknown if making peers' subjective well-being (SWB) available or visible in social networks may enhance or undermine cooperation. Therefore, we implemented online network experiments (N = 662 in 50 networked groups with 15 rounds of interactions), in which study participants cooperated with or defected against connected peers through Public Goods Game, made and cut social ties with others, and rated their SWB. We manipulated the visibility of connected peers' SWB (25 visible vs. 25 invisible SWB networked groups) while keeping the connected peers' reputation and in-game wealth visible. Results show that making the peers/ SWB visible did not alter overall cooperativeness, wealth, inter-connectedness, or SWB. In contrast, the visible SWB networked groups exhibited a higher number of communities and lower transitivity (the proportion of the cases where a peer of a peer is also a peer) than the invisible SWB networked groups. These phenomena are explained by an altered decision-making pattern in the visible SWB networks: cooperators were less likely to connect with cooperators and more likely to connect with defectors, and consequently, cooperators could not maintain their popularity or stay in the center of the networks.