标题： 当发送者具有透明动机时，更知情的发送者有利于接收者 显示英文标题

标题： A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives

摘要： 发送方具有与状态无关的偏好（即透明动机），在向接收方发送信息之前，会私下观察关于世界状态的信号，接收方随后采取行动。 无论接收方能否中介——并承诺对发送方的信息进行模糊处理——或者委托——承诺根据信息制定随机决策规则——并且将“接收方由于发送方信息的改进而状况更好”理解为她的最大和最小均衡收益（弱）随着发送方的信号改善（在Blackwell意义上）而增加，我们发现如果发送方更了解情况，接收方就会更好。 显示英文摘要

摘要： A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver can mediate--and commit to a garbling of the sender's message--or delegate--commit to a stochastic decision rule as a function of the message--and understanding the statement ``the receiver is better off as a result of an improvement of the sender's information'' to mean that her maximal and minimal equilibrium payoffs (weakly) increase as the sender's signal improves (in a Blackwell sense), we find that if the sender is more informed, the receiver is better off.