标题： 线性二次平均场博弈中的粗相关均衡及其在减排博弈中的应用 显示英文标题

标题： Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game

摘要： 粗略相关均衡（CCE）是纳什均衡（NE）的一个良好替代方案，因为它们作为学习算法的结果出现得更自然，并且可能比NE提供更高的收益。 CCE包括一个设备，允许玩家的策略在没有合作的情况下通过代理发送的信息进行相关联。 我们开发了一种方法，在线性二次平均场博弈框架中具体计算平均场CCE。 我们将它们的性能与平均场控制解决方案和平均场NE（通常称为MFG解决方案）进行比较。 我们的方法在温室气体排放者之间的排放削减游戏的平均场版本中实现。 特别是，我们展示了一个简单且易于处理的平均场CCE类，能够显著优于平均场NE的收益和减排水平，弥合了平均场NE与通过平均场控制获得的社会最优之间的差距。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are a good alternative to Nash equilibria (NE), as they arise more naturally as outcomes of learning algorithms and they may exhibit higher payoffs than NE. CCEs include a device which allows players' strategies to be correlated without any cooperation, only through information sent by a mediator. We develop a methodology to concretely compute mean field CCEs in a linear-quadratic mean field game framework. We compare their performance to mean field control solutions and mean field NE (usually named MFG solutions). Our approach is implemented in the mean field version of an emission abatement game between greenhouse gas emitters. In particular, we exhibit a simple and tractable class of mean field CCEs which allows to outperform very significantly the mean field NE payoff and abatement levels, bridging the gap between the mean field NE and the social optimum obtained by mean field control.