标题： 一种针对组合包的核心选择拍卖 显示英文标题

标题： A core-selecting auction for portfolio's packages

摘要： 我们引入了“局部-全局”方法用于可分投资组合，并对核心选择拍卖的两种变体进行了均衡分析。 我们的主要创新是在动态两轮设置中扩展了最近-VCG定价规则，减轻了投标人的搭便车动机，并进一步降低了卖方的成本。 两轮设置包含一种信息揭示机制，可能抵消“胜者诅咒”，并且与现有组合拍卖的迭代过程一致。 随着组合交易日益成为投资策略的重要部分，我们的机制有助于增加对组合拍卖协议的兴趣。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We introduce the "local-global" approach for a divisible portfolio and perform an equilibrium analysis for two variants of core-selecting auctions. Our main novelty is extending the Nearest-VCG pricing rule in a dynamic two-round setup, mitigating bidders' free-riding incentives and further reducing the sellers' costs. The two-round setup admits an information-revelation mechanism that may offset the "winner's curse", and it is in accord with the existing iterative procedure of combinatorial auctions. With portfolio trading becoming an increasingly important part of investment strategies, our mechanism contributes to increasing interest in portfolio auction protocols.