标题： 耐用品垄断与免费处理：一个常识定理 显示英文标题

标题： Durable Goods Monopoly with Free Disposal: A Folk Theorem

摘要： 我们研究了一个具有差异化商品的动态垄断模型，买家可以自由处置商品。 该模型将科斯式讨价还价框架扩展到商品数量或质量内生决定的情况。 我们的主要结果是，当参与者耐心时，卖方可以在均衡中维持从最低可能的买方估值到（大约）具有承诺能力时可实现的最高收益之间的任何收益，从而建立一个民间定理。 我们将模型应用于数据市场，其中数据经纪人向生产商出售营销名单。 在方法论上，我们利用了顺序讨价还价与静态机制设计之间的联系。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study a model of dynamic monopoly with differentiated goods that buyers can freely dispose of. The model extends the framework of Coasian bargaining to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined. Our main result is that when players are patient, the seller can sustain in equilibrium any payoff between the lowest possible buyer valuation and (approximately) the highest payoff achievable with commitment power, thus establishing a folk theorem. We apply our model to data markets, where data brokers sell marketing lists to producers. Methodologically, we leverage the connection between sequential bargaining and static mechanism design.