标题： 获取知情偏好 显示英文标题

标题： Eliciting Informed Preferences

摘要： 如果人们发现评估可用选项的成本过高，他们的选择可能无法直接揭示他们的偏好。然而，可以设想，研究人员仍然可以通过精心设计的实验来了解一个群体的偏好。我们在一个机制设计的稳健模型中形式化了研究人员的问题，在这个模型中，个人了解自己对产品价值的程度是有成本的。我们刻画了研究人员可以识别的统计量，并发现这些统计量是非常受限的。最后，我们将我们的积极成果应用于社会选择，并提出了一种对抗 uninformed voting 的方法。 显示英文摘要

摘要： If people find it costly to evaluate the options available to them, their choices may not directly reveal their preferences. Yet, it is conceivable that a researcher can still learn about a population's preferences with careful experiment design. We formalize the researcher's problem in a model of robust mechanism design where it is costly for individuals to learn about how much they value a product. We characterize the statistics that the researcher can identify, and find that they are quite restricted. Finally, we apply our positive results to social choice and propose a way to combat uninformed voting.