标题： 策略性防御与社交网络中的拍卖单调分配 显示英文标题

标题： Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks

摘要： 策略性在网络拍卖中要求投标者不仅如实报告他们的估值，还要尽力从社交网络中邀请邻居。 与经典拍卖不同，Myerson引理中的价值单调分配是其核心，但策略性网络拍卖的分配规则的一般原则仍然缺失。 我们表明，由于缺乏这样的原则，即使是对具有单单位需求的多单位网络拍卖的扩展也出现了意想不到的困难，所有先驱研究都无法实现策略性。 在该领域中，我们首次识别出网络上两种单调分配规则的类别： 邀请抑制单调性（ID-MON）和邀请促进单调性（IP-MON）。 它们涵盖了网络拍卖的所有现有分配规则作为具体实例。 对于任何给定的ID-MON或IP-MON分配规则，我们描述了策略性支付规则的存在性和充分条件，并表明在所有这些支付规则中，存在收益最大化的规则且计算上是可行的。 有了这些结果，具有单一意图投标者的组合网络拍卖的障碍现在已经解决。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.