标题： 内幕交易、公开披露与不完全竞争 显示英文标题

标题： Inside Trading, Public Disclosure and Imperfect Competition

摘要： 在本文中，我们提出了一种多时期交易模型，其风格类似于Kyle（1985）的内部交易模型，假设市场上至少有两名拥有长期私人信息的内部人员，并且要求每位内部人员在交易后公开披露其股票交易。 基于此模型，我们研究了“公开披露”和“内部人员之间的竞争”对内部人员交易行为的影响。 我们发现，“内部人员之间的竞争”会导致更高的有效价格和较低的内部人员利润，而“公开披露”使得每个内部人员在每一回合（除最后一回合外）都采取混合策略。 一个有趣的发现是，当拍卖的总次数趋于无穷时，在“公开披露”要求下，市场深度和第一次拍卖的交易强度都是常数，而在没有“公开披露”要求的情况下，第一次拍卖的市场深度趋于零，第一次时期的交易强度趋于无穷。此外，我们给出了私人信息揭示的确切速度，并表明所有信息都会立即被揭示，且在交易无限频繁发生时，市场深度会立即趋于无穷。 显示英文摘要

摘要： In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle (1985)'s inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insiders in the market with long-lived private information, under the requirement that each insider publicly discloses his stock trades after the fact. Based on this model, we study the influences of "public disclosure" and "competition among insiders" on the trading behaviors of insiders. We find that the "competition among insiders" leads to higher effective price and lower insiders' profits, and the "public disclosure" makes each insider play a mixed strategy in every round except the last one. An interesting find is that as the total number of auctions goes to infinity, the market depth and the trading intensity at the first auction are all constants with the requirement of "public disclosure", while the market depth at the first auction goes to zero and the trading intensity of the first period goes to infinity without the requirement of "public disclosure".Moreover, we give the exact speed of the revelation of the private information, and show that all information is revealed immediately and the market depth goes to infinity immediately as trading happens infinitely frequently.