标题： 复杂网络对基于模块的攻击的脆弱性 显示英文标题

标题： Complex networks vulnerability to module-based attacks

摘要： 在跨学科的网络科学领域，对高效破坏复杂网络的程序进行优化，从实际角度来看正引起广泛关注。 在本贡献中，我们提出了一种基于模块的方法来高效破坏复杂网络。 该过程首先识别网络可以表示的社区，然后根据其在介数中心性排名列表中的顺序删除连接不同模块的节点（边）。 我们通过将其应用于各种著名的社会、基础设施和生物网络示例来说明该方法。 我们表明，所提出的方法总是优于基于节点（边）度或中心性排名的顶点（边）攻击，在某些示例中效率有巨大提升。 值得注意的是，对于美国电力网络，该方法通过仅删除164个节点（约3%），将原始包含4941个节点的网络分解为许多小于197个节点（原始规模的4%）的碎片。 相比之下，任何基于度或中心性的方法，删除相同数量的节点，仅能移除原始网络的22%，即删除后仍有超过3800个节点保持连接。 显示英文摘要

摘要： In the multidisciplinary field of Network Science, optimization of procedures for efficiently breaking complex networks is attracting much attention from practical points of view. In this contribution we present a module-based method to efficiently break complex networks. The procedure first identifies the communities in which the network can be represented, then it deletes the nodes (edges) that connect different modules by its order in the betweenness centrality ranking list. We illustrate the method by applying it to various well known examples of social, infrastructure, and biological networks. We show that the proposed method always outperforms vertex (edge) attacks which are based on the ranking of node (edge) degree or centrality, with a huge gain in efficiency for some examples. Remarkably, for the US power grid, the present method breaks the original network of 4941 nodes to many fragments smaller than 197 nodes (4% of the original size) by removing mere 164 nodes (~3%) identified by the procedure. By comparison, any degree or centrality based procedure, deleting the same amount of nodes, removes only 22% of the original network, i.e. more than 3800 nodes continue to be connected after that