标题： 一种基于证据选择的简约理论 显示英文标题

标题： A parsimonious theory of evidence-based choice

摘要： 一个代理可能的证据状态形成一个布尔代数（在其上自然可以定义一个概率测度），这一断言在证明理性选择作为期望效用的表示时，应理想地被证明而非假设。 这里提供了一个更简洁的、公理化的证据描述。 两个原始实体是证据状态和一种比证据状态之间更具体的关系。 公理规定，“更具体”是一种偏序，存在一个最小具体的e状态，并且“更具体”是一种分离序。 选择备选方案是另一个原始实体。 一个计划是在每个证据状态上分配一个选择备选方案。 一般来说，满足某种形式的确定性原则的计划不能通过期望效用来合理化。 但如果证据结构是一棵树，则存在这样的合理化。 显示英文摘要

摘要： That an agent's possible evidential states form a Boolean algebra (on which it is natural to define a probability measure) is an assertion that ideally should be proved, rather than assumed, in justifying rational choice as a representation of expected utility. A more parsimonious, axiomatic characterization of evidence is provided here. Two primitive entities are evidential states and a relation, more specific than, between evidential states. The axioms specify that more-specific-than is a partial order, there is a minimally specific e-state, and more-specific-than is a separative order. Choice alternatives are another primitive entity. A plan is an assignment of a choice alternative to each evidential state. In general, plans satisfying a version of the sure-thing principle cannot be rationalized by expected utility. But there is such a rationalization if the evidential structure is a tree.