标题： 可信频谱拍卖以实现认知无线电网络中的高效抗干扰 显示英文标题

标题： Truthful Spectrum Auction for Efficient Anti-Jamming in Cognitive Radio Networks

摘要： 在认知无线电网络中一个重要的挑战是设计一个框架，使得自私的次级用户被迫相互之间诚实地互动。 此外，由于这些网络容易受到干扰攻击的威胁，设计抗干扰防御机制同样重要。 提供安全防御也非常重要。 在本文中，我们提出了一种对干扰具有鲁棒性的诚实机制，用于由多个自私的次级用户和一个恶意用户组成的动态随机认知无线电网络。 在这个模型中，每个次级用户参与拍卖并希望使用未被干扰的频谱，而恶意用户则试图通过破坏通信链路来干扰一个信道。 设计了一个次级用户之间的诚实拍卖机制。 此外，还制定了次级用户集合与恶意用户之间的零和博弈。 然后将这一联合问题转化为一种随机的两级拍卖，其中第一级拍卖分配空闲信道，然后第二级拍卖分配剩余未分配的信道。 我们还将此解决方案转换为一种可信的分布式方案。 仿真结果表明，分布式算法可以在没有额外开销和复杂性的情况下实现接近集中式算法的性能。 显示英文摘要

摘要： One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability of these networks against jamming attacks, designing anti-jamming defense mechanisms is equally important. %providing the security defense is also of great importance. In this paper, we propose a truthful mechanism, robust against the jamming, for a dynamic stochastic cognitive radio network consisting of several selfish secondary users and a malicious user. In this model, each secondary user participates in an auction and wish to use the unjammed spectrum, and the malicious user aims at jamming a channel by corrupting the communication link. A truthful auction mechanism is designed among the secondary users. Furthermore, a zero-sum game is formulated between the set of secondary users and the malicious user. This joint problem is then cast as a randomized two-level auctions in which the first auction allocates the vacant channels, and then the second one assigns the remaining unallocated channels. We have also changed this solution to a trustful distributed scheme. Simulation results show that the distributed algorithm can achieve a performance that is close to the centralized algorithm, without the added overhead and complexity.