标题： 三人非完美信息博弈的成功纳什均衡代理 显示英文标题

标题： Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a 3-Player Imperfect-Information Game

摘要： 创建具有超过两个玩家的游戏中的强大代理是人工智能领域的一个主要开放问题。 常见的方法是基于近似博弈论解概念，如纳什均衡，在两人零和游戏中有强大的理论保证，但在非零和游戏或超过两个玩家的游戏中没有保证。 我们描述了一个代理，它能够在三人不完美信息游戏中使用精确的纳什均衡策略击败各种现实对手。 这表明，尽管缺乏理论保证，基于纳什均衡策略的代理最终仍可以在多人游戏中取得成功。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a 3-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.