标题： 集中式匹配中的自愿信息披露：效率收益与战略特性 显示英文标题

标题： Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties

摘要： 信息摩擦会损害双边匹配市场参与者的福利。 考虑一个集中录取系统，其中大学无法观察学生在特定专业或学位课程中取得成功的准备情况。 大学在使用简单的、低成本的录取标准（例如，高中成绩作为准备程度的代理）与筛选所有申请之间进行选择，这会耗费学生和大学的时间。 为了解决公平性和福利问题，我们引入了两种新的机制，允许学生自愿披露私人信息，因此只需要部分筛选。 这些机制基于延迟接受，并保留了其核心战略属性，特别是序数策略性诚实。 此外，我们证明了在某些条件下，与不进行筛选相比，市场参与者的基数福利会得到改善。 直觉上，如果关于学生的公共信息与学生的私人信息相关性较弱，并且处理披露信息的成本足够低，那么学生和大学都能从自愿的信息披露中受益。 最后，我们提供了来自丹麦高等教育系统的实证证据，支持我们模型的关键特征。 我们的工作对信息摩擦固有的大型双边市场的机制设计具有政策意义。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for success in a particular major or degree program. Colleges choose between using simple, cheap admission criteria, e.g., high school grades as a proxy for preparedness, or screening all applications, which is time-consuming for both students and colleges. To address issues of fairness and welfare, we introduce two novel mechanisms that allow students to disclose private information voluntarily and thus only require partial screening. The mechanisms are based on Deferred Acceptance and preserve its core strategic properties of credible preference revelation, particularly ordinal strategy-proofness. In addition, we demonstrate conditions for which cardinal welfare improves for market participants compared to not screening. Intuitively, students and colleges benefit from voluntary information disclosure if public information about students correlates weakly with students' private information and the cost of processing disclosed information is sufficiently low. Finally, we present empirical evidence from the Danish higher education system that supports critical features of our model. Our work has policy implications for the mechanism design of large two-sided markets where information frictions are inherent.