标题： 组织中的人才囤积 显示英文标题

标题： Talent Hoarding in Organizations

摘要： 大多数组织依赖经理人来识别有才华的员工。 然而，那些根据团队绩效进行评估的经理人有动机囤积员工。 这项研究首次使用一家大型制造公司的人员记录和调查证据，提供了关于人才囤积的实证证据。 三分之四的经理人报告存在人才囤积现象，这种现象可以在管理决策中被检测到，并且在囤积激励更强时发生得更频繁。 利用对人才囤积暴露程度的准随机变化，我证明了囤积行为会阻止员工申请新的职位，阻碍员工的职业发展，并改变公司内部人才的分配。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large manufacturing firm. Talent hoarding is reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in managerial decisions, and occurs more frequently when hoarding incentives are stronger. Using quasi-random variation in exposure to talent hoarding, I demonstrate that hoarding deters workers from applying to new positions, inhibiting worker career progression and altering the allocation of talent in the firm.