标题： 俄罗斯石油的数量限制和价格折扣 显示英文标题

标题： Quantity restrictions and price discounts on Russian oil

摘要： 在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后，西方国家一直在寻找限制俄罗斯石油收入的方法。 本文从理论和定量的角度考虑了两种这样的选项：1）出口数量限制和2）对俄罗斯石油的强制折扣。 我们构建了一个可量化的全球石油市场模型，并分析了这些政策如何影响：哪些俄罗斯油田会停止生产；全球石油供应；以及全球石油价格。 通过这些静态分析，我们得出了这些政策对俄罗斯石油利润和石油进口国经济盈余的影响。 这些政策对俄罗斯石油利润的影响是显著的。 在短期内（第一年以内），20%的出口数量限制会导致俄罗斯每天损失6200万美元，相当于国内生产总值的1.2%和军事开支的32%。 在长期（超过一年后），新的投资将变得无利可图。 损失增加到每天1亿美元，相当于国内生产总值的2%和军事开支的56%。 20%的价格折扣对俄罗斯更为有害，导致每天损失1.52亿美元，相当于国内生产总值的3.1%和军事开支的85%，无论是在短期还是长期。 与出口数量限制相比，价格折扣通常会给俄罗斯带来更大的负担，而给进口国带来的负担更小。 事实上，价格折扣意味着石油进口国获得了净收益，因为它基本上将石油租金从俄罗斯重新分配给了进口国。 如果这些限制预计会持续较长时间，那么对石油进口国的负担将减少。 总体而言，所有层级的这些政策都意味着俄罗斯相对于石油进口国而言有更大的相对损失（以国内生产总值的比例计算）。 因此，对俄罗斯石油实行价格折扣的理由是很充分的。 然而，俄罗斯可能会选择不在折扣价格下出口，这种情况下，价格折扣制裁就变成了事实上的供应限制。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Western countries have looked for ways to limit Russia's oil income. This paper considers, theoretically and quantitatively, two such options: 1) an export-quantity restriction and 2) a forced discount on Russian oil. We build a quantifiable model of the global oil market and analyze how each of these policies affect: which Russian oil fields fall out of production; the global oil supply; and the global oil price. By these statics we derive the effects of the policies on Russian oil profits and oil-importers' economic surplus. The effects on Russian oil profits are substantial. In the short run (within the first year), a quantity restriction of 20% yields Russian losses of 62 million USD per day, equivalent to 1.2% of GDP and 32% of military spending. In the long run (beyond a year) new investments become unprofitable. Losses rise to 100 million USD per day, 2% of GDP and 56% of military spending. A price discount of 20% is even more harmful to Russia, yielding losses of 152 million USD per day, equivalent to 3.1% of GDP and 85% of military spending in the short run and long run. A price discount puts generally more burden on Russia and less on importers compared to a quantity restriction. In fact, a price discount implies net gains for oil importers as it essentially redistributes oil rents from Russia to importers. If the restrictions are expected to last for long, the burden on oil importers decreases. Overall, both policies at all levels imply larger relative losses for Russia than for oil importers (in shares of their GDP). The case for a price discount on Russian oil is thus strong. However, Russia may choose not to export at the discounted price, in which case the price-discount sanction becomes a de facto supply restriction.