标题： 顺序抽样均衡 显示英文标题

标题： Sequential Sampling Equilibrium

摘要： 本文介绍了一个基于顺序抽样的均衡框架，其中参与者对其对手行为存在战略不确定性，并获取信息性信号以解决这一问题。 顺序抽样均衡提供了一个有纪律的模型，该模型具有内生的选择、信念和决策时间分布，不仅合理解释了对纳什均衡的已知偏离，还做出了由现有数据支持的新预测。 它建立了实证学习与战略复杂性之间的关系，并通过抽样固有的随机性产生随机选择，而无需依赖于无差异或选择错误。 此外，当抽样成本消失时，它为纳什均衡提供了合理的解释。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a disciplined model featuring an endogenous distribution of choices, beliefs, and decision times, that not only rationalizes well-known deviations from Nash equilibrium, but also makes novel predictions supported by existing data. It grounds a relationship between empirical learning and strategic sophistication, and generates stochastic choice through randomness inherent to sampling, without relying on indifference or choice mistakes. Further, it provides a rationale for Nash equilibrium when sampling costs vanish.