标题： 柠檬水来自柠檬：信息设计与逆向选择 显示英文标题

标题： Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection

摘要： 卖方为一个物品设定价格。 卖方和买方的价值可能是相互依赖的。 我们对所有信息结构中的收益向量进行了表征。 简单的可行性约束和个体理性约束确定了收益集合。 买方可以获得全部剩余；通常，其他机制无法扩大收益集合。 我们还研究了当买方比卖方更了解情况时的收益，以及当买方完全了解情况时的收益。 在明显的特殊情况下，这三个收益集合才会重合——特别是当“柠檬市场”中卖方不了解情况而买方完全了解情况时出现完全崩溃的情况。 显示英文摘要

摘要： A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints identify the payoff set. The buyer can obtain the entire surplus; often, other mechanisms cannot enlarge the payoff set. We also study payoffs when the buyer is more informed than the seller, and when the buyer is fully informed. All three payoff sets coincide (only) in notable special cases -- in particular, when there is complete breakdown in a ``lemons market'' with an uninformed seller and fully-informed buyer.