标题： 风筝和鹌鹑：与战略金融市场的货币政策和沟通 显示英文标题

标题： Kites and Quails: Monetary Policy and Communication with Strategic Financial Markets

摘要： 我们提出一个模型，研究当市场参与者具有战略性且意外事件威胁其稳定性时，将金融稳定纳入中央银行目标的后果。 在这种设置下，中央银行对经济冲击反应不足，这一预测与2023年银行业危机期间美联储的行为一致。 此外，政策制定者的稳定担忧会扭曲投资者的选择，导致效率低下。 如果中央银行对其政策意图拥有私人信息，均衡的前瞻性指引会导致信息损失，突显了通过政策和沟通稳定市场之间的权衡。 一个“基什”型的中央银行家，其对稳定性的重视程度较低，可以减少这些低效率。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We propose a model to study the consequences of including financial stability among the central bank's objectives when market players are strategic, and surprises compromise their stability. In this setup, central banks underreact to economic shocks, a prediction consistent with the Federal Reserve's behavior during the 2023 banking crisis. Moreover, policymakers' stability concerns bias investors' choices, inducing inefficiency. If the central bank has private information about its policy intentions, the equilibrium forward guidance entails an information loss, highlighting a trade-off between stabilizing markets through policy and communication. A "kitish" central banker, who puts less weight on stability, reduces these inefficiencies.