标题： 集体抽样：事前视角 显示英文标题

标题： Collective Sampling: An Ex Ante Perspective

摘要： 我研究集体动态信息获取。 参与者通过一种集体停止规则决定何时停止顺序抽样，该规则指定了可以在达成一致后终止信息获取的决定性联盟。 我开发了一种方法，从事前视角来描述均衡。 玩家选择后验信念的分布，而不是停止策略，这些分布受到主要化约束。 均衡抽样区域通过基于凹化的不动点论证来描述。 集体抽样会产生学习低效性，而更多的决定性联盟通常会减少学习。 我将该模型应用于委员会搜索和说服中的竞争。 显示英文摘要

摘要： I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players decide when to stop sequential sampling via a collective stopping rule, which specifies decisive coalitions that can terminate information acquisition upon agreement. I develop a methodology to characterize equilibria using an ex ante perspective. Instead of stopping strategies, players choose distributions over posterior beliefs subject to majorization constraints. Equilibrium sampling regions are characterized via a fixed-point argument based on concavification. Collective sampling generates learning inefficiencies and having more decisive coalitions typically reduces learning. I apply the model to committee search and competition in persuasion.