标题： 社会偏好和期望效用 显示英文标题

标题： Social preferences and expected utility

摘要： 众所周知，事前社会偏好和预期效用并不总是兼容的。 在这篇笔记中，我们引入了一个新的框架，该框架自然地将社会偏好与自私偏好区分开来，以回答以下问题：哪些特定形式的社会偏好可以在预期效用范式内被容纳？ 不同于现有的框架，我们的框架揭示了在博弈中，只要决策者对自私效用随机化的厌恶“抵消”她的社会偏好，事前社会偏好与预期效用并不必然冲突。 我们还表明，当一个玩家在博弈（相对于另一个玩家）和相关的决策问题（相对于自然）中的偏好都符合预期效用公理时，可容许的社会偏好的范围明显受限。 只有在这种条件下，我们才重新确认现有文献关于事前不平等厌恶与预期效用不兼容的关键洞见。 显示英文摘要

摘要： It is well known that ex ante social preferences and expected utility are not always compatible. In this note, we introduce a novel framework that naturally separates social preferences from selfish preferences to answer the following question: What specific forms of social preferences can be accommodated within the expected utility paradigm? In a departure from existing frameworks, our framework reveals that ex ante social preferences are not inherently in conflict with expected utility in games, provided a decision-maker's aversion to randomization in selfish utility "counterbalances" her social preference for randomization. We also show that when a player's preferences in both the game (against another player) and the associated decision problem (against Nature) conform to expected utility axioms, the permissible range of social preferences becomes notably restricted. Only under this condition do we reaffirm the existing literature's key insight regarding the incompatibility of ex ante inequality aversion with expected utility.