标题： 一种解释实验博弈中非纳什均衡策略行为的理论框架 显示英文标题

标题： A theoretical framework to explain non-Nash equilibrium strategic behavior in experimental games

摘要： 传统博弈论假设参与者是完全理性的。 然而在现实情况下，参与者很少是完全理性的。 这种有限理性是规范博弈论中纳什均衡预测常常与真实实验中人类行为相偏离的主要原因之一。 受玻尔兹曼权重形式的启发，这里我们提出一个理论框架，通过关注参与者预期收益的差异而不是传统的效用度量，来预测战略游戏中可能结果的非纳什均衡概率。 在这个模型中，有限理性通过为每个参与者分配一个温度来参数化，该温度通过在两种决策机制之间插值来反映其理性水平，即效用最大化和等概率选择。 我们的框架可以预测所有可能的联合策略，并能够确定多个纯策略或混合策略均衡的相对概率。 为了验证模型预测，通过分析实验数据，我们证明了我们的模型可以成功解释实验博弈中的非纳什均衡策略行为。 我们的方法重新诠释了博弈论中的温度概念，利用理论框架的发展来弥合规范博弈论预测与行为实验结果之间的差距。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in normative game theory often diverge from human behavior in real experiments. Motivated by the Boltzmann weight formalism, here we present a theoretical framework to predict the non-Nash equilibrium probabilities of possible outcomes in strategic games by focusing on the differences in expected payoffs of players rather than traditional utility metrics. In this model, bounded rationality is parameterized by assigning a temperature to each player, reflecting their level of rationality by interpolating between two decision-making regimes, i.e., utility maximization and equiprobable choices. Our framework predicts all possible joint strategies and is able to determine the relative probabilities for multiple pure or mixed strategy equilibria. To validate model predictions, by analyzing experimental data we demonstrated that our model can successfully explain non-Nash equilibrium strategic behavior in experimental games. Our approach reinterprets the concept of temperature in game theory, leveraging the development of theoretical frameworks to bridge the gap between the predictions of normative game theory and the results of behavioral experiments.