标题： 以太坊质押市场的形式化框架 显示英文标题

标题： Towards a Formal Framework of the Ethereum Staking Market

摘要： 本文研究了以太坊质押者各类别对共识发行计划变化的反应，以及此类变化对质押市场构成的潜在影响。 为此，我们开发并校准了一个以太坊质押市场的博弈论模型，结合了各种质押代理之间的战略互动。 我们的研究结果表明，单独质押者可能比使用中心化交易所或流动质押提供者的ETH持有者更敏感于质押奖励的变化。 这种更高的敏感性不仅由单独质押的成本结构驱动，还由市场上不同质押解决方案之间的竞争动态驱动。 当面临向下倾斜的发行计划时，质押代理竞争有限的质押收益，它们的质押供应选择会影响其他质押者的收益。 因此，当质押时有其他质押方法可以访问MEV收益和其他DeFi收益来源，以及不关注的质押者存在时，会对单独质押者产生竞争压力。 因此，我们的模型预测，发行量的减少可能会排挤单独质押者。 我们使用工具变量估计方法提供了初步的实证证据来支持这一结果，以估计不同质押类别的质押供应收益率弹性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper examines how various categories of Ethereum stakers respond to changes in the consensus issuance schedule, and the potential impact of such changes on the composition of the staking market. To this end, we have develop and calibrate a game-theoretic model of the Ethereum staking market, incorporating strategic interactions between various staking agents. Our findings suggest that solo stakers may be more sensitive to variations in staking rewards than ETH holders using centralized exchanges or liquid staking providers. This increased sensitivity is driven not only by the cost structure of solo staking, but also by the competitive dynamics between different staking solutions in the market. When faced with a downward-sloping issuance schedule, staking agents compete for limited staking yields, and their choice of staking supply affects the revenues of other stakers. Therefore, the presence of other staking methods with access to MEV revenues and other DeFi yield sources when staking, as well as inattentive stakers, puts competitive pressure on solo stakers. Consequently, our model predicts that a reduction in issuance is likely to crowd out solo stakers. We present preliminary empirical evidence to support this result, using an instrumental variable estimation approach to estimate the yield elasticity of staking supply for different staking categories.