标题： 多尖叫信道攻击：频率多样性以增强攻击 显示英文标题

标题： Multi-Screaming-Channel Attacks: Frequency Diversity for Enhanced Attacks

摘要： 侧信道攻击包括通过分析泄漏来检索受害系统的内部数据，这通常需要在受害者的毫米范围内。 尖叫信道是在几米远传输的电磁（EM）侧信道。 它们出现在混合信号设备上，这些设备在同一硅片上集成了射频（RF）模块和数字部分。 因此，侧信道被合法的射频信号载波调制，并出现在数字时钟频率的谐波上。 虽然早期的工作仅考虑收集这些谐波处的泄漏，但后期的研究表明泄漏也存在于这些谐波之外的频率。 这一结果显著增加了可用于执行尖叫信道攻击的可用频率数量，在多个谐波受到污染的环境中可能非常方便。 本研究探讨了如何利用这种携带泄漏的频率多样性来提高攻击性能。 首先，我们研究了如何组合多个频率。 其次，我们证明了频率组合可以提高攻击性能，并根据组合频率的性能评估这种改进。 最后，我们在15米的距离上展示了频率组合的优势，并且首次（据我们所知）在30米的距离上进行了展示。 一个重要的观察结果是，这种频率组合将达到特定攻击性能所需的轨迹数量减少了一半。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at a distance of a few meters. They appear on mixed-signal devices integrating an RF module on the same silicon die as the digital part. Consequently, the side channels are modulated by legitimate RF signal carriers and appear at the harmonics of the digital clock frequency. While initial works have only considered collecting leakage at these harmonics, late work has demonstrated that the leakage is also present at frequencies other than these harmonics. This result significantly increases the number of available frequencies to perform a screaming-channel attack, which can be convenient in an environment where multiple harmonics are polluted. This work studies how this diversity of frequencies carrying leakage can be used to improve attack performance. We first study how to combine multiple frequencies. Second, we demonstrate that frequency combination can improve attack performance and evaluate this improvement according to the performance of the combined frequencies. Finally, we demonstrate the interest of frequency combination in attacks at 15 and, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, at 30 meters. One last important observation is that this frequency combination divides by 2 the number of traces needed to reach a given attack performance.