标题： 给予还是不给予？ 战略性隐瞒追索权的影响 显示英文标题

标题： To Give or Not to Give? The Impacts of Strategically Withheld Recourse

摘要： 个体通常希望通过与自动化系统的交互来逆转不希望出现的结果（例如贷款拒绝），方法是实施系统推荐的操作（即恢复措施）或操纵其特征。虽然提供恢复措施可以造福用户并提高系统效用，但它也提供了关于决策过程的信息，这些信息可以被用于更有效的战略性操纵，特别是在个体集体共享此类信息的情况下。 我们表明，这种紧张关系导致理性的效用最大化的系统经常不提供恢复措施，从而降低了整体人口的效用，尤其影响敏感群体。 为了缓解这些影响，我们探讨了恢复补贴的作用，发现它们在增加理性系统提供恢复操作方面有效，同时降低了潜在的社会成本，并缓解了因恢复措施缺失而造成的不公平现象。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Individuals often aim to reverse undesired outcomes in interactions with automated systems, like loan denials, by either implementing system-recommended actions (recourse), or manipulating their features. While providing recourse benefits users and enhances system utility, it also provides information about the decision process that can be used for more effective strategic manipulation, especially when the individuals collectively share such information with each other. We show that this tension leads rational utility-maximizing systems to frequently withhold recourse, resulting in decreased population utility, particularly impacting sensitive groups. To mitigate these effects, we explore the role of recourse subsidies, finding them effective in increasing the provision of recourse actions by rational systems, as well as lowering the potential social cost and mitigating unfairness caused by recourse withholding.