标题： 再次出局：武器化自动核系统有多危险？ 显示英文标题

标题： Out of the Loop Again: How Dangerous is Weaponizing Automated Nuclear Systems?

摘要： 核武器是否可用于胁迫，如果是，哪些因素增加了核威胁的可信度和有效性？尽管著名学者托马斯·谢林认为，核边缘政策或核风险的操纵可以有效地胁迫对手，但也有人认为核武器并不是有效的胁迫工具，尤其是在旨在实现进攻性和修正主义目标的情况下。 同时，关于人工智能（AI）融入军事系统，特别是核指挥与控制系统的讨论也十分广泛。 我们提出了一个理论论点，即使用自动化核发射系统的明确核威胁可能比模糊的核威胁或通过非自动化手段实施的明确核威胁更具可信度。通过减少对核使用的人员控制，领导人可以更有效地束缚自己的行动，从而发出坚定的信号。 虽然自动化核武器发射系统可能看起来像是科幻小说中的东西，但苏联在冷战期间就部署了这样的系统，近年来由于人工智能的进步，使用武力自动化的技术已经得到了相当大的发展。 对英国议会精英成员样本和两个英国公民公共样本的预先注册调查实验提供了这些预期的支持，表明在有限的情况下，由AI集成支持的核威胁具有可信度优势，无论它们可能多么危险。 我们的发现有助于胁迫谈判、大规模杀伤性武器以及新兴技术的研究文献。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Are nuclear weapons useful for coercion, and, if so, what factors increase the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear threats? While prominent scholars like Thomas Schelling argue that nuclear brinkmanship, or the manipulation of nuclear risk, can effectively coerce adversaries, others contend nuclear weapons are not effective tools of coercion, especially coercion designed to achieve offensive and revisionist objectives. Simultaneously, there is broad debate about the incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) into military systems, especially nuclear command and control. We develop a theoretical argument that explicit nuclear threats implemented with automated nuclear launch systems are potentially more credible compared to ambiguous nuclear threats or explicit nuclear threats implemented via non-automated means. By reducing human control over nuclear use, leaders can more effectively tie their hands and thus signal resolve. While automated nuclear weapons launch systems may seem like something out of science fiction, the Soviet Union deployed such a system during the Cold War and the technology necessary to automate the use of force has developed considerably in recent years due to advances in AI. Preregistered survey experiments on an elite sample of United Kingdom Members of Parliament and two public samples of UK citizens provide support for these expectations, showing that, in a limited set of circumstances, nuclear threats backed by AI integration have credibility advantages, no matter how dangerous they may be. Our findings contribute to the literatures on coercive bargaining, weapons of mass destruction, and emerging technology.