标题： 双渠道闭环供应链中异质顾客的最优定价策略：建模方法 显示英文标题

标题： Optimal Pricing Strategies for Heterogeneous Customers in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chains: A Modeling Approach

摘要： 双渠道闭环供应链（DCCLSCs）在实现可持续性和盈利性方面发挥着至关重要的作用。 本文引入了一个博弈论模型，分析了在三种不同的回收框架下，针对初次购买和替换购买客户的最优定价策略：制造商主导、零售商主导和合作回收。 该模型确定了每种情景下的均衡定价和补贴决策，考虑了初次购买客户对直接渠道的偏好以及回收中的特定角色。 研究结果表明，制造商倾向于在直接渠道中设定比零售商更低的价格，旨在刺激需求并促进以旧换新。 制造商主导的回收计划导致价格稳定，而零售商主导的回收需要更高的补贴。 合作回收策略则会降低价格并增加以旧换新的数量。 初次购买客户对直接渠道的偏好显著影响定价策略，偏好更强会导致直接渠道价格更低，并且制造商补贴更高。 本文通过将初次购买客户的渠道偏好和多样的回收框架纳入DCCLSC定价模型，为该领域做出了贡献。 这些见解帮助制造商和零售商根据初次购买客户的偏好及相关成本调整定价策略和以旧换新激励措施，从而提高DCCLSCs内的盈利能力和回收效率。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Dual-channel closed-loop supply chains (DCCLSCs) play a vital role in attaining both sustainability and profitability. This paper introduces a game-theoretic model to analyze optimal pricing strategies for primary and replacement customers within three distinct recycling frameworks: manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and collaborative recycling. The model identifies equilibrium pricing and subsidy decisions for each scenario, considering the primary customer's preference for the direct channel and the specific roles in recycling. The findings indicate that manufacturers tend to set lower prices in direct channels compared to retailers, aiming to stimulate demand and promote trade-ins. Manufacturer-led recycling initiatives result in stable pricing, whereas retailer-led recycling necessitates higher subsidies. Collaborative recycling strategies yield lower prices and an increase in trade-ins. Primary customers' preference for the direct channel significantly impacts pricing strategies, with a stronger preference leading to lower direct-channel prices and higher manufacturer subsidies. This paper contributes to the field by incorporating primary customer channel preferences and diverse recycling frameworks into DCCLSC pricing models. These insights assist manufacturers and retailers in adjusting pricing strategies and trade-in incentives according to primary customer preferences and associated costs, thereby enhancing profitability and recycling efficiency within DCCLSCs.