标题： 跨多个游戏的互动：合作、腐败与组织设计 显示英文标题

标题： Interactions across multiple games: cooperation, corruption, and organizational design

摘要： 在某些情况下（“好游戏”）团队合作对社会有益，而在其他情况下（“坏游戏”；例如允许腐败的游戏）则不然。 在任何给定游戏中，团队的合作取决于对未来迭代中的好游戏和坏游戏合作预期的依赖。 我们确定了在什么情况下，维持好游戏中的合作需要在坏游戏中也进行合作。 然后我们描述了设计者应该如何最优地将工人分配到团队，以及将团队分配到涉及不同好游戏和坏游戏到达率的任务。 我们的结果表明，组织设计可以用来促进合作同时最小化腐败。 显示英文摘要

摘要： It is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in some situations (``good games'') and not in others (``bad games;'' e.g., those that allow for corruption). A team's cooperation in any given game depends on expectations of cooperation in future iterations of both good and bad games. We identify when sustaining cooperation on good games necessitates cooperation on bad games. We then characterize how a designer should optimally assign workers to teams and teams to tasks that involve varying arrival rates of good and bad games. Our results show how organizational design can be used to promote cooperation while minimizing corruption.