标题： 临时工是否面临更高的工资折扣？ 来自印度汽车行业的证据 显示英文标题

标题： Do Temporary Workers Face Higher Wage Markdowns? Evidence from India's Automotive Sector

摘要： 临时工是否比正式工受到不同的工资折扣？ 本文研究了2000年至2020年间印度汽车行业的生产率、产出折扣和工资折扣。 我构建了一个模型，结合了CES生产、嵌套对数劳动供给和差异化的劳动力市场行为：临时工的纳什-伯特兰工资设定与工会化正式工的纳什讨价还价。 结果表明，随着边际成本超过价格，产出折扣下降。 劳动增强型生产率上升无法抵消希克斯中性生产率的下降，从而降低了总体全要素生产率。 劳动力市场权力显著压缩了工人报酬：临时工的工资折扣持续为40%，而正式工为10%。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Are temporary workers subject to different wage markdowns than permanent workers? This paper examines productivity, output markups, and wage markdowns in India's automotive sector during 2000--2020. I develop a model integrating CES production, nested logit labor supply, and differentiated labor market conduct: Nash-Bertrand wage setting for temporary workers versus Nash bargaining for unionized permanent workers. Results reveal declining output markups as marginal costs outpace prices through productivity deceleration. Rising labor-augmenting productivity cannot offset declining Hicks-neutral productivity, reducing overall TFP. Labor market power substantially compresses worker compensation: wage markdowns persist at 40% for temporary workers and 10% for permanent workers.