标题： 同质多对象分配问题中的平等等价和策略稳健机制 显示英文标题

标题： Egalitarian-equivalent and strategy-proof mechanisms in homogeneous multi-object allocation problems

摘要： 我们研究了在有金钱的情况下，将同质且不可分割的物品分配给代理的问题。 特别是，我们探讨了作为公平概念的平等等价性（Pazner 和 Schmeidler，1978）与代理人的激励约束下的效率之间的关系。 作为第一个结果，我们刻画了满足平等等价性、策略性诚实、个体理性和无补贴的机制类。 我们的刻画揭示了平等等价性和效率之间存在强烈的矛盾：在这些性质下，机制仅在有限情况下分配物品。 为了解决这一限制，我们将策略性诚实替换为较弱的激励属性，即不明显的操纵性（Troyan 和 Morrill，2020）。 我们证明，这种放松使我们能够设计出在仍确保平等等价性的前提下实现效率的机制。 此外，在实现效率之后，我们在所刻画的类中确定了代理最优的机制。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and efficiency under agents' incentive constraints. As a first result, we characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Our characterization reveals a strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency: under these properties, the mechanisms allocate objects only in limited cases. To address this limitation, we replace strategy-proofness with the weaker incentive property, non-obvious manipulability (Troyan and Morrill, 2020). We show that this relaxation allows us to design mechanisms that achieve efficiency while still ensuring egalitarian-equivalence. Furthermore, upon achieving efficiency, we identify the agent optimal mechanism in the characterized class.