标题： 一个无限重复网络博弈的 Folk 定理 显示英文标题

标题： A Folk Theorem for Indefinitely Repeated Network Games

摘要： 我们考虑一个重复博弈，其中玩家被视为网络中的节点，彼此相连。 每个玩家只能观察其邻居的行动。 因此，监控是私有的且不完全的。 玩家可以在每个阶段与邻居进行通信；对于任何邻居子集，每个玩家向该子集中的任何玩家发送相同的信息。 因此，通信是局部的，既是公开的又是私有的。 通信和监控结构均由网络决定。 解决方案概念是完美贝叶斯均衡。 在本文中，我们证明当且仅当网络对于任何数量的玩家都是2-连通时，folk定理成立。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We consider a repeated game in which players, considered as nodes of a network, are connected. Each player observes her neighbors' moves only. Thus, monitoring is private and imperfect. Players can communicate with their neighbors at each stage; each player, for any subset of her neighbors, sends the same message to any player of that subset. Thus, communication is local and both public and private. Both communication and monitoring structures are given by the network. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this paper we show that a folk theorem holds if and only if the network is 2-connected for any number of players.