标题： 会有人审阅这篇论文吗？ 筛选、排序和危害同行评审的反馈循环 显示英文标题

标题： Will anyone review this paper? Screening, sorting, and the feedback cycles that imperil peer review

摘要： 学术出版依赖同行评审来识别最好的科学成果。 然而，找到愿意且有资格的评审人来评估稿件已成为一项日益艰巨的任务，甚至可能威胁到同行评审作为一项制度的长期可行性。 应该做些什么来挽救它呢？ 在这里，我们开发数学模型，以揭示作者、评审人和读者在努力识别最佳科学时所面临的激励之间的复杂相互作用。 有两个方面特别显著。 首先，同行评审通过作者决定将稿件发送到何处，部分揭示了作者对自己作品质量的私人看法。 其次，期刊依赖于传统上不支付报酬且几乎没有奖励的评审劳动，这使它们失去了标准的市场机制——工资——当评审劳动供不应求时，无法招募更多的评审人。 我们强调了一个可能使同行评审系统不堪重负的反馈循环：(1) 提交量的增加使合适的同行评审人员池超负荷；(2) 由于期刊要么必须求助于资格较低的评审人，要么要求现有评审人承担更多工作，评审的准确性下降；(3) 随着评审准确性的下降，提交量进一步增加，因为更多作者试图在可能并不适合的刊物上碰运气。 我们展示了这一循环如何受到包括对高影响力出版物日益重视、期刊数量的增加以及这些期刊之间竞争同行评审等因素的进一步推动。 最后，我们提出了可能减缓甚至逆转这一同行评审崩溃循环的干预措施。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Scholarly publishing relies on peer review to identify the best science. Yet finding willing and qualified reviewers to evaluate manuscripts has become an increasingly challenging task, possibly even threatening the long-term viability of peer review as an institution. What can or should be done to salvage it? Here, we develop mathematical models to reveal the intricate interactions among incentives faced by authors, reviewers, and readers in their endeavors to identify the best science. Two facets are particularly salient. First, peer review partially reveals authors' private sense of their work's quality through their decisions of where to send their manuscripts. Second, journals' reliance on traditionally unpaid and largely unrewarded review labor deprives them of a standard market mechanism -- wages -- to recruit additional reviewers when review labor is in short supply. We highlight a resulting feedback loop that threatens to overwhelm the peer review system: (1) an increase in submissions overtaxes the pool of suitable peer reviewers; (2) the accuracy of review drops because journals either must either solicit assistance from less qualified reviewers or ask current reviewers to do more; (3) as review accuracy drops, submissions further increase as more authors try their luck at venues that might otherwise be a stretch. We illustrate how this cycle is further propelled by forces including the increasing emphasis on high-impact publications, the proliferation of journals, and competition among these journals for peer reviews. Finally, we suggest interventions that could slow or even reverse this cycle of peer-review meltdown.