标题： 历史在社会学习中的价值：历史市场中的应用 显示英文标题

标题： Value of History in Social Learning: Applications to Markets for History

摘要： 在社会学习环境中，代理从私人信号和先前行为的观察中获取信息，这被称为历史。 我们定义历史的价值为从同时访问私人信号和历史相比仅依赖信号所带来的预期收益的增加。 我们首先描述最大化这一价值的信息结构，表明在完全信息和无信息的混合下价值最高。 然后我们将这些见解应用于历史市场的模型，其中垄断的数据卖家收集并出售历史的访问权。 在均衡状态下，卖家的动态定价成为每个代理的历史价值。 这使得卖家有动机通过设计信息结构来增加历史的价值。 卖家最优的信息披露比社会最优水平更少。 显示英文摘要

摘要： In social learning environments, agents acquire information from both private signals and the observed actions of predecessors, referred to as history. We define the value of history as the gain in expected payoff from accessing both the private signal and history, compared to relying on the signal alone. We first characterize the information structures that maximize this value, showing that it is highest under a mixture of full information and no information. We then apply these insights to a model of markets for history, where a monopolistic data seller collects and sells access to history. In equilibrium, the seller's dynamic pricing becomes the value of history for each agent. This gives the seller incentives to increase the value of history by designing the information structure. The seller optimal information discloses less information than the socially optimal level.