标题： 加拿大银行业的资金优势和市场纪律 显示英文标题

标题： Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

摘要： 我们使用全面的数据集和多种方法，提供关于加拿大大型银行在资金方面的优势程度的证据，以及加拿大银行发行的不同证券中市场纪律存在的程度。 加拿大的银行业部门提供了一个独特的环境，用于研究市场纪律以及拟议改革的前景，因为加拿大没有政府救助的历史，自20世纪20年代以来一直存在隐性政府担保。 我们在控制了银行特定和市场风险因素后发现，大型银行在资金方面优于小型银行。 大型银行平均在存款和次级债务上分别少支付80个基点和70个基点。 结合手工收集的大型银行债务发行的市场数据，我们还发现市场纪律存在于次级债务中，而不存在于高级债务中。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks' funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.