标题： 异质性贿赂、技术选择与资本积累 显示英文标题

标题： Heterogeneous Bribery, Technology Choice, and Capital Accumulation

摘要： 我们研究了在存在贿赂的情况下企业的生产、进入和技术决策。我们发现，即使在官僚效率不存在低下的情况下，贿赂也可能被证明是合理的。我们在148个国家中记录了贿赂的显著技术特定异质性，并将其纳入一个一般均衡模型中，其中企业使用资本密集型或劳动密集型技术。当贿赂更严重地影响效率较低的劳动密集型企业时，资源会流向更高效的资本密集型企业，从而导致更高的资本积累和总体产出。在较贫穷的国家，仅消除资本密集型企业的贿赂，会使资本存量增加18.7%，总体产出增加3.4%，比完全消除贿赂的效果更大。在较富裕的国家，仅消除资本密集型企业的贿赂，会使资本存量增加44.4%，总体产出增加15.4%，比完全消除贿赂的效果更大。我们的研究结果挑战了将贿赂视为普遍有害的既有观点。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the production, entry, and technological decisions of firms in the presence of bribery. We find that bribery can be justified even in the absence of bureaucratic inefficiencies. We document substantial technology-specific heterogeneity in bribery in 148 countries and incorporate it into a general equilibrium model, where firms use capital-intensive or labor-intensive technology. When bribery more heavily affects less efficient labor-intensive firms, resources move toward more efficient capital-intensive firms, resulting in higher capital accumulation and aggregate output. In poorer countries, the elimination of bribery only for capital-intensive firms increases the capital stock by 18.7% more and the aggregate output by 3.4% more than the complete elimination of bribery. In wealthier countries, the elimination of bribery only for capital-intensive firms increases the capital stock by 44.4% more and the aggregate output by 15.4% more than the complete elimination of bribery. Our findings challenge the established view of bribery as uniformly harmful.