标题： 超导量子硬件上的串扰攻击脉冲级仿真 显示英文标题

标题： Pulse-Level Simulation of Crosstalk Attacks on Superconducting Quantum Hardware

摘要： 多租户超导量子计算机中的硬件串扰构成严重的安全威胁，允许对手通过注入精心设计的脉冲在租户边界上引发目标错误。 我们对脉冲级别的主动串扰攻击进行了基于仿真的研究，分析了对手如何通过控制脉冲时间、形状、幅度和耦合来干扰受害者的计算。 我们的框架在旋转框架中对三量子比特系统的时变动力学进行建模，同时捕捉始终存在的耦合和注入的驱动脉冲。 我们检查了两种攻击策略：攻击者优先（脉冲在受害者操作之前）和受害者优先（脉冲在受害者操作之后），并系统地识别导致最大逻辑错误的脉冲和耦合配置。 在量子硬币翻转和XOR分类电路的协议级别实验表明，一些协议极易受到这些攻击，而其他协议则保持稳健。 基于这些发现，我们讨论了实际的检测和缓解方法，以提高量子云平台的安全性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Hardware crosstalk in multi-tenant superconducting quantum computers poses a severe security threat, allowing adversaries to induce targeted errors across tenant boundaries by injecting carefully engineered pulses. We present a simulation-based study of active crosstalk attacks at the pulse level, analyzing how adversarial control of pulse timing, shape, amplitude, and coupling can disrupt a victim's computation. Our framework models the time-dependent dynamics of a three-qubit system in the rotating frame, capturing both always-on couplings and injected drive pulses. We examine two attack strategies: attacker-first (pulse before victim operation) and victim-first (pulse after), and systematically identify the pulse and coupling configurations that cause the largest logical errors. Protocol-level experiments on quantum coin flip and XOR classification circuits show that some protocols are highly vulnerable to these attacks, while others remain robust. Based on these findings, we discuss practical methods for detection and mitigation to improve security in quantum cloud platforms.