标题： 稳定且公平的混合能源卡车编队利益分配：联盟博弈方法 显示英文标题

标题： Stable and Fair Benefit Allocation in Mixed-Energy Truck Platooning: A Coalitional Game Approach

摘要： 本文研究由燃油卡车和电动车组成的混合能源卡车编队中的利益分配问题。 在编队形成过程中，卡车之间的互动被建模为具有可转移效用的联盟博弈。 我们首先设计了一个稳定的收益分配方案，考虑了能量节省和编队角色（领导者或跟随者）的卡车异质性，并建立了核心稳定性条件，以确保没有任何卡车子集有动机为了获得更大利益而偏离。 为了提高收益公平性，我们随后提出了一种基于夏普利值的闭式分配方法，该方法计算效率高且与编队规模无关。 提供了分配既公平又核心稳定的充分条件。 在夏普利值不在核心的情况下的场景中，我们开发了一种基于稳定收益的替代分配方法，该方法在保持核心稳定性的同时，使平均相对偏差最小化。 进一步证明该偏差被$1$上界所限制，表明在稳定性和公平性之间具有有利的权衡。 最后，大量的数值研究验证了理论结果，并展示了所提出框架在促进混合能源卡车编队中稳定、公平和可持续合作的有效性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper addresses the benefit allocation in a mixed-energy truck platoon composed of fuel-powered and electric trucks. The interactions among trucks during platoon formation are modeled as a coalitional game with transferable utility. We first design a stable payoff allocation scheme that accounts for truck heterogeneity in energy savings and platoon roles (leader or follower), establishing core-stability conditions to ensure that no subset of trucks has an incentive to deviate for greater benefit. To enhance payoff fairness, we then propose a closed-form, Shapley value-based allocation approach that is computationally efficient and independent of the platoon size. Sufficient conditions under which the allocation is both fair and core-stable are provided. In scenarios where the Shapley value falls outside the core, we develop an alternative allocation based on the stable payoff that minimizes the mean relative deviation from the Shapley value while preserving core stability. This deviation is further proved to be upper-bounded by $1$, showing a favorable trade-off between stability and fairness. Finally, extensive numerical studies validate the theoretical results and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in facilitating stable, equitable, and sustainable cooperation in mixed-energy truck platooning.