标题： 基于网络攻击的小语言离散事件系统的监督控制 显示英文标题

标题： Supervisory Control of Discrete Event Systems for Small Language Under Cyber Attacks

摘要： 网络化离散事件系统中，由于植物和监督器通过网络进行通信，网络攻击是不可避免的。 由于网络攻击引起的观察和控制的非确定性，受监督系统的语言变得非确定性。 小语言被定义为受监督系统可能生成的所有语言的下界，这是在受到网络攻击时受监督系统执行某些所需任务所需要的。 在本文中，我们研究小语言的监督控制。 在引入CA-S可控性和CA-S可观性之后，我们证明了实现所需小语言的监督控制问题只有在给定语言是CA-S可控且CA-S可观的情况下才是可解的。 如果给定的语言不是CA-S可控和/或CA-S可观的，我们推导出存在最小的CA-S可控且CA-S可观的超语言的条件，并可以用来设计满足给定要求的监督器。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Cyber attacks are unavoidable in networked discrete event systems where the plant and the supervisor communicate with each other via networks. Because of the nondeterminism in observation and control caused by cyber attacks, the language generated by the supervised system becomes nondeterministic. The small language is defined as the lower bound on all possible languages that can be generated by the supervised system, which is needed for a supervised system to perform some required tasks under cyber attacks. In this paper, we investigate supervisory control for the small language. After introducing CA-S-controllability and CA-S-observability, we prove that the supervisory control problem of achieving a required small language is solvable if and only if the given language is CA-Scontrollable and CA-S-observable. If the given language is not CA-S controllable and/or CA-S-observable, we derive conditions under which the infimal CA-S-controllable and CA-S-observable superlanguage exists and can be used to design a supervisor satisfying the given requirement.