标题： 量子力学的解释：多世界还是多言辞？ 显示英文标题

标题： The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?

摘要： 前沿实验显示出越来越多的非经典行为形式，量子力学诠释的主流观点似乎正在逐渐改变。 1997年UMBC量子力学研讨会的一项（非常不科学的）投票显示，曾经占据主导地位的哥本哈根诠释获得了不到一半的选票。多世界诠释（MWI）排名第二，明显领先于一致历史诠释和玻姆诠释。 有人认为，由于上述所有针对非相对论性量子力学的诠释在实践中给出的计算方法完全相同，注重实际的实验物理学家通常采用“闭嘴并计算”的诠释，他们对舒适的经典概念是否实际上在某种不可测试的形而上学意义上真实存在，或者仅仅是主观上感知到一个在数学上更简单的世界（在这个世界中薛定谔方程描述了一切）并不感兴趣——因此，他们对众多世界的存在比对众多词汇的存在感到更加不纠结。 讨论了对MWI的常见反对意见。有人认为，当考虑到环境诱导的退相干时，除了涉及一种拜占庭式的“量子自杀”实验外，MWI的实验预测与哥本哈罗诠释的实验预测是相同的。这使得两者之间的选择纯粹是个人喜好的问题，大致相当于一个人认为数学语言还是人类语言更基本的问题。 显示英文摘要

摘要： As cutting-edge experiments display ever more extreme forms of non-classical behavior, the prevailing view on the interpretation of quantum mechanics appears to be gradually changing. A (highly unscientific) poll taken at the 1997 UMBC quantum mechanics workshop gave the once all-dominant Copenhagen interpretation less than half of the votes. The Many Worlds interpretation (MWI) scored second, comfortably ahead of the Consistent Histories and Bohm interpretations. It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics give identical cookbook prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the ``shut-up-and-calculate interpretation'', typically show little interest in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some untestable metaphysical sense or merely the way we subjectively perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrodinger equation describes everything - and that they are therefore becoming less bothered by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion of words. Common objections to the MWI are discussed. It is argued that when environment-induced decoherence is taken into account, the experimental predictions of the MWI are identical to those of the Copenhagen interpretation except for an experiment involving a Byzantine form of ``quantum suicide''. This makes the choice between them purely a matter of taste, roughly equivalent to whether one believes mathematical language or human language to be more fundamental.