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Electrical Engineering and Systems Science > Systems and Control

arXiv:2212.01570 (eess)
[Submitted on 3 Dec 2022 (v1) , last revised 12 Mar 2023 (this version, v2)]

Title: Two-Player Incomplete Games of Resilient Multiagent Systems

Title: 双玩家不完全弹性多智能体系统

Authors:Yurid Nugraha, Tomohisa Hayakawa, Hideaki Ishii, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Quanyan Zhu
Abstract: Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a game-theoretical approach of multiagent systems where the players have incomplete information on their opponents' strength. We consider repeated games with both simultaneous and sequential player actions where players update their beliefs of each other over time. The effect of the players' optimal strategies according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on agents' consensus is examined. It is shown that an attacker with incomplete knowledge may fail to prevent consensus despite having sufficient resources to do so.
Abstract: 在面对干扰攻击时,讨论了共识协议下多智能体系统中智能体动态的演变,其中集中方能够影响智能体的控制信号。 本文关注多智能体系统的博弈论方法,其中玩家对其对手实力的信息不完全。 我们考虑同时和顺序玩家行动的重复博弈,其中玩家随时间更新彼此的信念。 研究了根据贝叶斯纳什均衡和完美贝叶斯均衡的玩家最优策略对智能体共识的影响。 结果表明,即使攻击者拥有足够的资源,但因知识不完整也可能无法阻止共识。
Comments: 9 pages, 6 figures. Accepted in IFAC-WC 2023
Subjects: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:2212.01570 [eess.SY]
  (or arXiv:2212.01570v2 [eess.SY] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2212.01570
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Yurid Nugraha [view email]
[v1] Sat, 3 Dec 2022 08:01:18 UTC (358 KB)
[v2] Sun, 12 Mar 2023 03:36:21 UTC (358 KB)
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