标题： 谁拯救我们免受风险? 利他主义者在公共投资博弈中促进合作 显示英文标题

标题： Who Saves us From Risk? Altruists Promote Cooperation in a Public Investment Game

摘要： 在充满风险的世界中提供公共资源对人类生存至关重要，然而却更容易受到“搭便车”问题的困扰。 在这里，我们提出了一种解决方案，即限制资源的访问权限给一个代理，并通过一种新颖的公共投资游戏测试其效率。 在每次试验中，所有小组成员都向负责赌博和分配的代理投资。 代理提取资源后，非代理小组成员之间平均分配资源。 在3个实验室实验（n = 704）中，我们发现，作为代理，许多参与者提取的资源比其他人少。 这种利他主义的分配策略提高了合作水平。 此外，这种促进合作的效果可以传播到与利他代理同一组的自私代理，并在一次性的设置中被复制。 我们认为，当公共资源面临风险时，这种分配解决方案比已广泛记录的惩罚解决方案更优。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Providing commons in the risky world is crucial for human survival, however, suffers more from the "free-riding" problem. Here, we proposed a solution that limits the access of the resource to an agent and tested its efficiency with a novel public investment game. On each trial, all group members invest in an agent responsible for a gamble and distribution. Resources are distributed evenly between non-agent group members after the agent extracts for him/herself. In 3 laboratory experiments (n = 704), we found that, as an agent, many participants extracted fewer resources than others. This altruistic distribution strategy improved cooperation levels. Furthermore, this cooperation-promoting effect could be spread to selfish agents who are in the same group as the altruistic agent and was replicated in a one-shot setting. We proposed that, when the commons are under risk, this distribution solution serves as a better alternative to the well-documented sanction solutions.