标题： 量子拍卖 显示英文标题

标题： Quantum Auctions

摘要： 我们提出了一种量子拍卖协议，使用叠加态来表示出价，并使用分布式搜索来确定获胜者（或获胜者集合）。 测量最终的量子态即可得出拍卖结果，同时破坏叠加态。 因此，未获胜的出价永远不会被揭示。 参与者可以利用纠缠态在他们的出价之间安排相关性，且无需担心这种纠缠态会被他人观察到。 该协议适用于信息隐藏类应用，例如具有分配外部性的合伙投标或关于暴露出价偏好的担忧。 该协议适用于多种拍卖类型，例如第一价格或第二价格拍卖，并适用于单一物品或任意物品组合（即组合拍卖）的拍卖。 我们分析了量子协议在密封投标量子拍卖中的博弈论行为，并展示了如何通过适当设计的绝热搜索减少投标人操控拍卖的可能性。 此设计展示了激励机制而非计算约束如何影响量子算法的选择。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entanglement is not observable by others. The protocol is useful for information hiding applications, such as partnership bidding with allocative externality or concerns about revealing bidding preferences. The protocol applies to a variety of auction types, e.g., first or second price, and to auctions involving either a single item or arbitrary bundles of items (i.e., combinatorial auctions). We analyze the game-theoretical behavior of the quantum protocol for the simple case of a sealed-bid quantum, and show how a suitably designed adiabatic search reduces the possibilities for bidders to game the auction. This design illustrates how incentive rather that computational constraints affect quantum algorithm choices.