标题： 短期电力市场模型中价格分歧的出现 显示英文标题

标题： Emergence of Price Divergence in a Model Short-Term Electric Power Market

摘要： 一个由短视非合作代理人的市场最小模型，他们通过随机报价进行双边交易，再现了短期电力市场的定性特征，例如加利福尼亚和新英格兰的市场。 每个代理人都知道自己的预算和偏好，但不知道其他任何代理人的预算和偏好。 在交易会话中间建立的接近均衡的价格在交易会话结束时向更高和更低的价格发散。 这种价格发散在模型中出现，而代理人在任何情况下都没有可能合谋“操纵”市场。 结果对初始分配的敏感度较弱，但对代理人的偏好和预算约束的性质非常敏感。 显示英文摘要

摘要： A minimal model of a market of myopic non-cooperative agents who trade bilaterally with random bids reproduces qualitative features of short-term electric power markets, such as those in California and New England. Each agent knows its own budget and preferences but not those of any other agent. The near-equilibrium price established mid-way through the trading session diverges to both much higher and much lower prices towards the end of the trading session. This price divergence emerges in the model without any possibility that the agents could have conspired to "game" the market. The results were weakly sensitive to the endowments but strongly sensitive to the nature of the agent's preferences and budget constraints.