标题： 自然博弈 显示英文标题

标题： Natural games

摘要： 在博弈论的背景下，行为被描述为一种遵循热力学第二定律的自然过程。 熵的增加速率作为收益函数，来源于开放系统的统计物理。 热力学形式主义以能量为基准描述一切，并说明了消耗自由能的各种方式。 这使我们能够将行为的博弈论模型与物理现实联系起来。 最终，行为被视为一种物理过程，能量流会自然地选择尽快消耗自由能的方式。 根据深刻的热力学原理，这一自然过程等价于在最短时间内熵的增加。 然而，行为的物理描述并不意味着决定论。 相反，开放系统的演化方程表明，当行为有三个或更多自由度时，游戏的进程在细节上本质上是不可预测的，因为每一步都会影响未来动作的动机。 最终，当找不到能消耗更多自由能的动作时，扩展形式博弈将达到满足最小最大定理的解概念。 该均衡在策略内的行为变化中是Lyapunov稳定的，但会被一种新策略扰动，该策略会吸引更多的周围资源进入游戏。 作为收益函数的熵也阐明了合作的动机和决策的主观性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Behavior in the context of game theory is described as a natural process that follows the 2nd law of thermodynamics. The rate of entropy increase as the payoff function is derived from statistical physics of open systems. The thermodynamic formalism relates everything in terms of energy and describes various ways to consume free energy. This allows us to associate game theoretical models of behavior to physical reality. Ultimately behavior is viewed as a physical process where flows of energy naturally select ways to consume free energy as soon as possible. This natural process is, according to the profound thermodynamic principle, equivalent to entropy increase in the least time. However, the physical portrayal of behavior does not imply determinism. On the contrary, evolutionary equation for open systems reveals that when there are three or more degrees of freedom for behavior, the course of a game is inherently unpredictable in detail because each move affects motives of moves in the future. Eventually, when no moves are found to consume more free energy, the extensive-form game has arrived at a solution concept that satisfies the minimax theorem. The equilibrium is Lyapunov-stable against variation in behavior within strategies but will be perturbed by a new strategy that will draw even more surrounding resources to the game. Entropy as the payoff function also clarifies motives of collaboration and subjective nature of decision making.