标题： 个体和制度惩罚在空间公共物品博弈中的竞争 显示英文标题

标题： Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games

摘要： 我们研究了在空间公共物品博弈中策略的演化，其中除了无条件的背叛者和合作者策略外，还存在个体（同伴）和制度（池）惩罚策略。 策略分布的演化由模仿机制控制，该机制基于固定噪声水平下邻居收益的随机顺序比较。 通过数值模拟，我们评估了在变化的协同因子、惩罚成本和罚款情况下策略频率和相图。 我们的注意力集中在两个极端情况，这些情况描述了此类复杂系统中的所有相关行为。 根据我们的数值数据，在参数的大部分区域中，同伴惩罚者占主导地位并控制系统行为，而池惩罚者只能在弱同伴惩罚的极限下生存，并且观察到多种多样的解决方案。 矛盾的是，这两种惩罚类型可能会相互消除其影响，导致背叛者的胜利。 技术难题和建议的方法进行了简要讨论。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by imitation based on random sequential comparison of neighbors' payoff for a fixed level of noise. Using numerical simulations we have evaluated the strategy frequencies and phase diagrams when varying the synergy factor, punishment cost, and fine. Our attention is focused on two extreme cases describing all the relevant behaviors in such a complex system. According to our numerical data peer punishers prevail and control the system behavior in a large segments of parameters while pool punishers can only survive in the limit of weak peer punishment when a rich variety of solutions is observed. Paradoxically, the two types of punishment may extinguish each other's impact resulting in the triumph of defectors. The technical difficulties and suggested methods are briefly discussed.