标题： 糖税的最佳政策设计 显示英文标题

标题： Optimal policy design for the sugar tax

摘要： 健康营养推广和法规长期以来被视为提高社会福利的工具。 过去十年采取的一个途径是通过引入糖税来规范糖的消费。 这种税收增加了含糖量高的产品（如软饮料）的价格。 在本文中，我们考虑了一个典型的最优监管政策设计问题，任务是确定最大化社会福利的糖税税率。 我们将这个问题建模为一个由三层数学规划表示的序贯博弈。 在最高层，政府决定税收税率。 在中间层，生产商决定产品定价。 在最低层，消费者决定他们对产品的偏好。 虽然一般问题在计算上是难以处理的，但对于少量产品类型的问题，即使有任意数量的不同消费者，也可以多项式时间求解。 本文提出了一种简单、直观且易于实施的框架，用于计算少数产品市场中的最优糖税。 这与现实情况相似，例如软饮料通常被分为普通饮料或无糖饮料，例如可口可乐和零度可乐。 我们使用基于真实数据的示例来说明该算法，并得出特定本地市场的结论。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Healthy nutrition promotions and regulations have long been regarded as a tool for increasing social welfare. One of the avenues taken in the past decade is sugar consumption regulation by introducing a sugar tax. Such a tax increases the price of extensive sugar containment in products such as soft drinks. In this article we consider a typical problem of optimal regulatory policy design, where the task is to determine the sugar tax rate maximizing the social welfare. We model the problem as a sequential game represented by the three-level mathematical program. On the upper level, the government decides upon the tax rate. On the middle level, producers decide on the product pricing. On the lower level, consumers decide upon their preferences towards the products. While the general problem is computationally intractable, the problem with a few product types is polynomially solvable, even for an arbitrary number of heterogeneous consumers. This paper presents a simple, intuitive and easily implementable framework for computing optimal sugar tax in a market with a few products. This resembles the reality as the soft drinks, for instance, are typically categorized in either regular or no-sugar drinks, e.g. Coca-Cola and Coca-Cola Zero. We illustrate the algorithm using an example based on the real data and draw conclusions for a specific local market.