标题： 通过消费学习：内生信息提供的最优定价 显示英文标题

标题： Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision

摘要： 我们研究当买方的价值由于消费学习而内生变化时的收益最大化机制。 卖方出售一种可分割商品的一个单位，而买方依靠其私人、粗略的估值来选择第一阶段的消费水平。 消费更多会导致更精确的估值估计，之后买方决定第二阶段的消费水平。 最优方案是一份试用后决定的合同清单，包括一个第一阶段的价格-数量对和一个剩余数量的第二阶段单价。 在均衡中，第一阶段估值较高的买方为更高的第一阶段消费支付更多，并享受更低的第二阶段单价。 在方法论上，我们处理了由于单交叉条件失败所带来的困难，即分配的单调性加上包络条件不足以保证激励相容性。 我们的结果有助于理解具有学习特征的顺序消费合同；例如，体验商品的租赁合同和某些课程的试听环节。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his first-stage consumption level. Consuming more leads to a more precise valuation estimate, after which the buyer determines the second-stage consumption level. The optimum is a menu of try-and-decide contracts, consisting of a first-stage price-quantity pair and a second-stage per-unit price for the remaining quantity. In equilibrium, a higher first-stage valuation buyer pays more for higher first-stage consumption and enjoys a lower second-stage per-unit price. Methodologically, we deal with the difficulty that due to the failure of single-crossing condition, monotonicity in allocation plus the envelope condition is insufficient for incentive compatibility. Our results help to understand contracts about sequential consumption with the learning feature; e.g., leasing contracts for experience goods and trial sessions for certain courses.