标题： 具有远见学生的学校选择 显示英文标题

标题： School Choice with Farsighted Students

摘要： 我们考虑具有远见学生的基于优先权的学校选择问题。 我们证明由顶点交易循环（TTC）机制得到的匹配组成的单例集是一个远见稳定集。 然而，由延迟接受（DA）机制得到的匹配可能不属于任何远见稳定集。 因此，TTC机制提供了一个不仅帕累托有效而且远见稳定的分配。 此外，向前展望三步已经足以稳定由TTC得到的匹配。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.